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Abstract	  Many	  academics	  and	  commentators	  argue	  that	  Europe	  is	  suffering	  from	  a	  democratic	  deficit.	  An	   interesting	  proposal	   that	  has	  been	  put	   forward	   to	  address	   this	  problem	   is	   to	  elect	   some	  members	  of	  the	  European	  parliament	  in	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district.	   In	  this	  article,	  we	  evaluate	  this	  proposal	  using	  an	  online	  experiment,	   in	  which	  thousands	  of	  Europeans	  voted	  on	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot	  we	  created.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  voting	  behaviour	  of	  European	  citizens	  would	  be	  strongly	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  candidates	  from	  their	  own	  country	  on	  the	  lists.	  If	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	   is	   created,	  our	   findings	  provide	  an	  argument	   in	   favour	  of	  using	  a	  closed-­‐‑list	  ballot,	  and	  establishing	  a	  maximum	  number	  of	  candidates	  from	  each	  country	  on	  the	  lists.	  	  
Keywords:	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   Pan-­‐‑European	   electoral	  district,	  Voting	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Introduction 	  There	   is	   a	   vivid	   debate	   in	   the	   literature	   about	   the	   (lack	   of)	   democratic	   legitimacy	   of	   the	  European	  Union	   (EU)	   (Kohler-­‐‑Koch	   and	  Rittberger,	   2007).	   Some	   argue	   that	   the	   democratic	  deficit	   is	   limited	   because	   EU	   decision-­‐‑makers	   are	   elected	   in	   well-­‐‑functioning	   national	  democracies	   and	   interact	   in	   an	   institutional	   framework	   characterized	  by	   strong	   checks	  and	  balances	  (Majone,	  1998;	  Moravcsik,	  2002).	  Others	  contend	  that	  the	  democratic	  deficit	  is	  severe	  because	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  discontent	  among	  European	  citizens	  regarding	  the	  EU	  in	  general	  and	  its	  legislative	  decision-­‐‑making	  process	  in	  particular	  (Hix,	  2008;	  Hooghe	  and	  Marx,	  2009;	  Karpet	  al.,	  2003;	  Rohrschneider,	  2002).	  	  Among	   those	   who	   accept	   that	   the	   perception	   of	   a	   democratic	   deficit	   is	   an	   important	  phenomenon	  (regardless	  of	  whether	  it	   is	  justified),	   it	   is	  often	  argued	  that	  the	  way	  European	  elections	  are	  organized	  does	  not	  help	  to	  reduce	  it.	  Although	  the	  European	  parliament	  (EP)	  is	  elected	   during	   a	   massive	   election	   where	   hundreds	   of	   millions	   of	   voters	   elect	   their	  representatives,	  national	  considerations	  usually	  dominate	  vote	  choice.	  European	  citizens	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  European	  elections,	  they	  often	  abstain,	  and	  they	  tend	  to	  use	  their	  vote	  as	  a	  way	  to	  protest	  against,	  or	  to	  reward,	  national	  governments,	  depending	  on	  the	  national	  electoral	  cycle	  (Hix	  and	  March,	  2007;	  Hobolt	  and	  Wittrock,	  2011;	  Reif	  and	  Schmitt,	  1980;	  Marsh,	  1998).	  Furthermore,	  parties	  use	  national	  instead	  of	  European	  labels	  to	  compete	  in	  EP	  elections,	  even	  if	  they	  form	  European	  political	  groups	  in	  the	  legislature	  after	  the	  election.	  	  An	  interesting	  proposal	  that	  has	  been	  put	  forward	  to	  address	  the	  EU’s	  democratic	  deficit	  is	  to	  change	  the	  districting	  system	  of	  the	  European	  election,	  and	  to	  elect,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  current	  national	  districts,	   a	   fixed	  number	  of	  members	  of	   the	  EP	   (MEPs)	   in	   a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district.	  Similar	   to	  national	  districts,	   the	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	  would	  use	  some	  sort	  of	  proportional	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representation	  (PR)	  and	  each	  European	  citizen	  would	  be	  invited	  to	  cast	  a	  vote	  for	  a	  European	  party	   on	   a	   one-­‐‑person-­‐‑one-­‐‑vote	   basis,	   regardless	   of	   her	   country. 1 	  Since	   candidates	   from	  different	  countries	  would	  be	  competing	  against	  each	  other,	   it	  would	  help	  develop	  a	  genuine	  European	   political	   space,	  where	   ideas	   and	   arguments	  would	   be	   debated	   transnationally.	   In	  turn,	   this	  development,	  often	  referred	   to	  as	   the	  politicisation	  of	   the	  EU,	   is	   likely	   to	   increase	  citizens’	  support	  for	  European	  integration	  (De	  Wilde,	  2011;	  Habermas,	  2012).	  A	  recent	  study	  shows	   that	  Europeans	  are	  willing	  and	  able	   to	  engage	   in	  such	  a	   transnational	  political	   space	  (Fiskin	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  	  In	  this	  article,	  we	  evaluate	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	  proposal.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  rely	  on	  a	  unique	  online	  experiment	   that	  we	  conducted	  during	   the	  2014	  EP	  election.	  We	   invited	   thousands	  of	  European	  citizens	  to	  report	  how	  they	  would	  vote	  on	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot.	  On	  this	  ballot,	  we	  randomised	  the	  nationality	  of	  candidates	  appearing	  on	  the	  various	  party	  lists.	  We	  are	  thus	  able	  to	  assess	  whether	  vote	  choice	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  candidates	  from	  the	  subjects’	  own	  country	  on	  the	  lists.	  Although	  the	  sample	  is	  not	  representative	  of	  the	  European	  electorate	  (see	  below),	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  effect	  we	  observe	  in	  our	  experiment	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  population	   of	   interest,	   especially	   since	   our	   sample	   is	   skewed	   towards	   pro-­‐‑EU	   citizens	   that	  should	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  national	  preference.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  our	  experiment,	  we	  asked	  participants	  whether	  they	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  trans-­‐‑national	  party	   lists	   competing	   in	   European	   elections.	   Of	   the	   1116	   people	   that	   fully	   completed	   our	  experiment	  (see	  the	  description	  of	  the	  sample	  below),	  59%	  responded	  that	  they	  liked	  it	  and	  23%	  that	  they	  did	  not.	  However,	  even	  if	  the	  proposal	  is	  approved	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  Europeans,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  evaluate	  how	  voters	  would	  react	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  change.	  If	  their	  vote	  is	  strongly	  affected	  by	  national	  considerations,	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	   that	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   pan-­‐‑European	   district	   as	   a	   way	   to	   address	   Europe’s	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democratic	  deficit	  will	  be	  threatened.	  	  
Creating	  an	  experimental	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot	  	  In	  the	  three	  weeks	  preceding	  the	  2014	  EP	  election,	  we	  conducted	  an	  online	  experiment	  (for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  details	  of	  this	  experiment,	  see	  Laslier	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  We	  created	  a	  multi-­‐‑lingual	  website,	   open	   to	   all,	   where	   users	   were	   invited	   to	   learn	  more	   about	   European	   elections	   in	  general	  and	  the	  rules	  used	  to	  elect	  MEPs,	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  online	  voting	  experiment.	  To	  recruit	   experimental	   subjects,	   we	   collaborated	  with	   local	   academic	   colleagues	   from	   almost	  every	  one	  of	   the	  28	  European	  countries.	  These	  colleagues	  were	   in	  charge	  of	  publicizing	   the	  website	  through	  national	  media.	  This	  operation	  was	  more	  successful	  in	  some	  countries	  than	  in	  others.	  In	  some	  of	  them,	  very	  few	  subjects	  completed	  the	  online	  experiment.	  To	  make	  sure	  that	  our	  results	  are	  not	  driven	  by	  very	  specific	  samples,	  we	  focus	  in	  this	  paper	  on	  the	  three	  countries	  for	  which	  we	  have	  the	  required	  data	  for	  more	  than	  200	  subjects:	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  Sweden.	  	  In	  the	  experimental	  part	  of	   the	  website,	  we	   invited	  subjects	   in	  seven	  pre-­‐‑selected	  European	  countries	   (Belgium,	   France,	   Germany,	   Hungary,	   the	   Netherlands,	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   and	  Sweden)	   to	   indicate	   their	   vote	  preference	   in	   the	  upcoming	  EP	  election	  using	   the	  party	   lists	  utilized	  in	  their	  district.	  We	  use	  this	  information	  to	  weight	  our	  sample	  and	  as	  controls	  in	  our	  regressions	  (see	  below).	  We	  also	  asked	  all	  subjects,	  regardless	  of	  their	  country,	  to	  indicate	  how	  they	  would	  vote	  if	  10	  additional	  MEPs	  were	  to	  be	  elected	  in	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district.	  This	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  study	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  article.	  Finally,	  we	  invited	  subjects	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  short	  questionnaire	  about	  their	  socio-­‐‑demographic	  profile	  and	  political	  attitudes.	  	  We	   simulated	   a	   pan-­‐‑European	   ballot	   by	   creating	   party	   lists	   based	   on	   the	   existing	   political	  groups	   in	   the	   EP.	   In	   the	   2009-­‐‑2014	   EP	   legislature,	   there	   were	   seven	   political	   groups:	   the	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European	   People's	   Party	   (EPP,	   centre-­‐‑right),	   the	   Progressive	   Alliance	   of	   Socialists	   and	  Democrats	  (S&D,	  centre-­‐‑left),	  the	  European	  Conservatives	  and	  Reformists	  (ECR,	  conservative-­‐‑Eurosceptic),	   the	  Alliance	  of	  Liberals	  and	  Democrats	   for	  Europe	  (ALDE,	   liberal-­‐‑centrist),	   the	  European	  United	  Left-­‐‑Nordic	  Green	  Left	   (GUE-­‐‑NGL,	   radical	   left),	   the	  Greens–European	  Free	  Alliance	  (Greens-­‐‑EFA,	  green),	  and	  the	  Europe	  of	  Freedom	  and	  Direct	  Democracy	  (EFD,	  right-­‐‑wing	  populist).	  We	  used	  these	  seven	  political	  groups	  to	  create	  seven	  lists	  on	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  if	  there	  had	  been	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  2014	   election,	   each	   of	   these	   groups	  would	  have	   formed	   a	   party	   list	   to	   compete	   against	   the	  others.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  we	  decided	  to	  set	  the	  number	  of	  MEPs	  elected	  in	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	  to	  10.2	  We	  thus	  had	  to	  present	  to	  the	  subjects	  10	  candidates	  per	  list.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  randomly	  picked,	  for	  each	  subject,	  10	  incumbent	  MEPs	  from	  each	  political	  group.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  although	   not	   all	   these	   MEPs	   were	   candidates	   for	   re-­‐‑election,	   selecting	   actual	   European	  politicians	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  making	  our	  experiment	  more	  realistic.	  	  On	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot	  we	  presented	  to	  the	  subjects	  the	  seven	  pan-­‐‑European	  lists,	  with	  the	  label	  and	  logo	  of	  the	  corresponding	  political	  group.	  The	  order	  of	  these	  lists	  varied	  randomly	  from	  user	  to	  user.	  We	  also	  disclosed	  the	  names	  of	  the	  10	  MEPs	  we	  randomly	  selected,	   their	  official	  MEP	  pictures,	  and	  their	  country	  of	  origin.	  Figures	  A1	  and	  A2	  in	  the	  online	  appendix	  show	  a	   screenshot	   of	   our	   pan-­‐‑European	   ballot	   under	   closed-­‐‑	   and	   open-­‐‑list	   PR,	   respectively	   (see	  below	  for	  a	  description	  of	  these	  two	  electoral	  systems).	  Subjects	  were	  able	  to	  click	  on	  the	  name	  of	  a	  candidate	  to	  access	  her	  webpage	  on	  the	  official	  EP	  website.	  	  The	  way	  we	  built	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballots	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  following	  clear	  and	  ‘neutral’	  rules.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  it	  excludes	  independent	  MEPs,	  as	  they	  were	  not	  part	  of	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any	  political	  group.	  	  Since	  the	  first	  election	  in	  1979,	  the	  European	  law	  stipulates	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  EP	  need	  to	  be	  elected	  through	  PR.	  However,	  each	  country	  can	  decide	  upon	  which	  variant	  of	  PR	  to	  use.	  In	  the	  2014	  EP	  election,	  89%	  of	  all	  European	  countries	  used	  either	  a	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR	  system,	  where	  voters	  have	  to	  cast	  a	  vote	  for	  a	  list,	  or	  an	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  system,	  where	  voters	  have	  to	  cast	  a	  vote	  for	   a	   list	   and	   for	   individual	   candidates	  within	   the	   list.3	  In	  both	   instances,	   the	   seats	   are	   first	  allocated	  among	  parties	  in	  proportion	  to	  the	  number	  of	  party-­‐‑votes	  received.	  However,	  the	  two	  electoral	   systems	   differ	   in	   how	   they	   allocate	   seats	   to	   individual	   candidates	   within	   parties.	  Under	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR,	  the	  seats	  are	  allocated	  to	  individual	  candidates	  according	  to	  the	  order	  of	  the	   list,	  while	   in	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  the	  allocation	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  number	  of	   individual	  votes	  received	  by	  each	  candidate.	  In	  our	  experiment,	  the	  ordering	  of	  the	  candidates	  on	  the	  list	  was	  random.	  In	  reality,	  this	  ordering	  is	  decided	  by	  the	  party,	  possibly	  under	  some	  constraint	  (for	  instance,	  alternating	  gender	  as	  in	  France).	  	  Several	  variants	  of	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  were	  used	  during	  the	  2014	  EP	  election.	  In	  Sweden,	  voters	  had	  to	  choose	  a	  single	  individual	  candidate	  on	  the	  party	  list	  they	  voted	  for.	  In	  Belgium,	  they	  could	  choose	   as	   many	   individual	   candidates	   as	   they	   wanted	   on	   their	   chosen	   party	   list.	   In	   our	  experiment,	  we	  invited	  users	  to	  vote	  under	  the	  variant	  used	  in	  Latvia	  where	  voters	  had	  to	  give	  a	  ‘+2’,	  a	  ‘+1’	  or	  a	  ‘0’	  to	  each	  of	  the	  individual	  candidates	  on	  the	  list	  they	  voted	  for	  (the	  ‘+1’	  is	  the	  default	  category).4	  This	  system	  is	  actually	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  used	  in	  Belgium	  except	  there	  voters	  have	  to	  choose	  between	  giving	  a	  ‘+1’	  or	  a	  ‘0’	  to	  each	  of	  the	  individual	  candidates	  of	  the	  list	  they	  vote	  for.	  	  	  In	   our	   online	   experiment,	   we	   asked	   all	   participants	   to	   cast	   hypothetical	   votes	   under	   three	  electoral	  systems:	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR	  (used	  in	  France	  and	  Germany),	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  (used	  in	  Latvia,	  as	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described	  above),	  and	  panachage	  with	  cumulation	  (used	  in	  Luxembourg).	  We	  used	  these	  three	  electoral	  systems	  for	  both	  ballots	  in	  the	  experiment,	  i.e.	  the	  actual	  national	  ballot	  of	  the	  subject’s	  district	  in	  the	  seven	  pre-­‐‑selected	  European	  countries	  mentioned	  above	  and	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot.	   This	   articles	   focusses	   on	   the	   pan-­‐‑European	   ballot	   and	   the	   closed-­‐‑	   and	   open-­‐‑list	   PR	  systems.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  these	  two	  electoral	  systems	  are	  the	  ones	  most	  commonly	  used	  in	  EP	  elections.	  	  	  
Theoretical	  expectations	  
	  Vote	  choice	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  function	  of	  two	  vectors	  of	  preferences:	  preferences	  over	  parties	  and	  preferences	  over	  individual	  candidates.	  Voters	  evaluate	  the	  various	  parties	  and	  candidates,	  and	  decide	  to	  cast	  their	  vote	  considering	  these	  two	  vectors.	  The	  literature	  has	  long	  focused	  on	  the	  determinants	  of	  preferences	  over	  parties,	  as	  these	  preferences	  are	  crucial	  to	  explain	  vote	  choice.	  The	  classic	  studies	  mention,	  for	  example,	  a	  voter’s	  socio-­‐‑economic	  status	  (Lazarsfeld	  et	  al.,	   1948),	   ideology	   (Downs,	   1956),	   partisan	   identification	   (Campbell	   et	   al.,	   1960),	   attitudes	  towards	  specific	  issues	  (Nieet	  al.,	  1999),	  and	  the	  overall	  reputation	  of	  parties	  (Stokes,	  1963).	  	  But	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  voters	  also	  take	  individual	  candidates	  into	  consideration	  (Canache	  et	  al.,	   2000;	  Cutler,	   2002).	  This	   tendency	   is	  probably	   even	  more	   frequent	  nowadays	  given	   the	  recent	  trend	  towards	  the	  personalisation	  of	  elections	  and	  politics	  in	  established	  democracies	  (Colomer,	  2011;	  Karvonen,	  2012).	  Recent	  research	  has	  investigated	  various	  determinants	  of	  preferences	  over	  candidates	  such	  as	  the	  candidate’s	  gender	  (Dolan,	  2014),	  appearance	  (Lawson	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  non-­‐‑verbal	  attributes	  (Dumitrescu	  et	  al.,	  2015),	  activity	  on	  Twitter	  (Spierings	  and	  Jacobs,	   2014),	  whether	   they	   introduce	   Private	  Members’	   bills	   in	   parliament	   (Loewen	   et	   al.,	  2014),	  whether	  they	  systematically	  follow	  the	  party	  line	  in	  parliamentary	  votes	  (Vivyan	  and	  Wagner,	  2012),	  and	  how	  frequently	  they	  visit	  their	  constituency	  (Crisp	  and	  Desposato,	  2004).	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  The	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  characteristics	  of	  candidates	  affect	  vote	  choice	  is	  also	  influenced	  by	  the	  electoral	   system.	  As	  claimed	  by	  Carey	  and	  Shugart	   (1995),	  as	   the	  number	  of	  candidates	  elected	   in	   the	   district	   increases,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   election	   is	   candidate-­‐‑oriented	  decreases.	  In	  large	  districts,	  individual	  candidates	  rely	  less	  on	  their	  own	  reputation,	  and	  more	  on	   the	   party,	   to	   be	   elected.	   However,	   open-­‐‑list	   PR	   systems	   function	   differently:	   district	  magnitude	  tends	  to	  have	  the	  opposite	  effect	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  focus	  on	  the	  candidates	  in	  the	  election,	  and	  candidate	  characteristics	  have	  a	  substantive	  impact	  on	  individual-­‐‑candidate	  votes	  (Shugart	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  André	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  	  In	  this	  strand	  of	  research,	  a	  special	  focus	  has	  been	  put	  on	  how	  local	  ties	  or	  local	  roots	  affect	  preferences	  over	  candidates.	  Several	  studies	  show	  that	  local	  candidates,	  i.e.	  those	  who	  are	  from	  the	  district	   in	  which	   they	   compete	   or	   have	   a	   special	   connection	  with	   the	  district,	   are	  more	  successful.	  Garand	  (1988)	  and	  Lewis-­‐‑Beck	  and	  Rice	  (1983)	  show	  for	  example	  that	  presidential	  candidates	  in	  the	  United	  States	  benefit	  from	  a	  substantial	  home	  state	  advantage.	  Local	  roots	  also	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  success	  of	  candidates	  in	  parliamentary	  democracies	  where	  elections	  are	  held	  under	  plurality	  rules.	  Blais	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  demonstrate	  moreover	  that	  in	  Canada	  vote	  choice	   is	   affected	   by	   voters’	   preferences	   over	   local	   candidates.	   In	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	  Arzheimer	  and	  Evans	  (2012)	  find	  that	  the	  smaller	  the	  geographic	  distance	  between	  a	  voter	  and	  a	  candidate	   in	  her	  district,	   the	  higher	   the	  probability	  of	  voting	   for	  her.	  Recent	  experimental	  studies	   even	   demonstrate	   that	   local	   roots	   are	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   candidate	  characteristics	  for	  voters	  (Campbell	  and	  Cowley,	  2014;	  Roy	  and	  Alcantara,	  2014).	  However,	  all	  of	  these	  studies	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  party	  to	  which	  the	  candidate	  belongs	  remains	  the	  most	  important	  predictor	  of	  vote	  choice.	  	  Local	   roots	   are	   also	   important	   in	   PR	   systems.	   March	   (2007)	   shows	   that	   under	   single	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transferable	  vote	  rules,	  voters	  tend	  to	  give	  a	  higher	  rank	  to	  candidates	  with	  local	  roots,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  affiliated	  with	  their	  preferred	  party.	  Shugart	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  find	  that	  parties	  tend	  to	  nominate	  candidates	  who	  have	  held	  political	  positions	  locally	  under	  both	  closed-­‐‑list	  and	  open-­‐‑list	  PR,	  and	  that	  this	  tendency	  increases	  with	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  district.	  André	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  complete	  this	  argument	  by	  adding	  that	   local	  roots	  are	   less	   important	   for	  candidate’s	  nomination	  in	  large	  districts.	  Using	  a	  similar	  indicator	  of	  localness,	  Tavits	  (2010)	  demonstrates	  that	  in	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  systems	  local	  candidates	  are	  more	  successful	  than	  others,	  and	  Riera	  (2011)	  finds	  that,	  even	  under	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR,	  party	  lists	  that	  are	  led	  by	  a	  candidate	  born	  and	  raised	  in	  the	  district	  tend	  to	  obtain	  slightly	  more	  votes.	  However,	  these	  studies	  again	  show	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  local	  roots	  on	  vote	  choice	  is	  marginal,	  compared	  to	  party	  preference.	  	  	  In	  our	  experiment,	  we	  expect	  co-­‐‑nationality	  between	  candidates	  and	  subjects	  to	  affect	  voting	  behaviour	  in	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot,	  just	  as	  co-­‐‑locality	  does	  in	  national	  elections.	  However,	  we	  expect	  the	  effect	  to	  be	  even	  stronger	  than	  in	  national	  elections	  given	  that	  Europeans	  from	  different	   countries	   show	   high	   levels	   of	   distrust	   for	   each	   other	   (Bornhorst	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  Klingemann	  and	  Weldon,	  2012),	  and	  that	  national	  identity	  is	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  explaining	  pro-­‐‑EU	  attitudes	  (Hooghe	  and	  Marks,	  2009).	  	  Our	   first	   hypothesis	   concerns	   the	   open-­‐‑list	   PR	   system.	   We	   expect	   co-­‐‑nationality	   to	   affect	  preferential	  votes.	  Under	  this	  electoral	  system,	  subjects	  could	  choose	  to	  give	  a	  positive	  (+2),	  negative	   (0)	   or	   neutral	   vote	   (+1)	   to	   each	   candidate	   on	   the	   list	   they	   chose.	   We	   expect	  experimental	  subjects	  to	  give	  more	  positive,	  and	  fewer	  negative,	  points	  to	  their	  co-­‐‑nationals.	  The	  hypothesis	  is	  thus:	  
	  
H1:	  The	  probability	  of	  a	  subject	  casting	  a	  positive	  (negative)	  individual	  candidate	  vote	  is	  higher	  when	  the	  candidate	  is	  (is	  not)	  a	  national	  of	  her	  country.	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  The	   second	   hypothesis	   concerns	   both	   closed-­‐‑	   and	   open-­‐‑list	   PR	   systems.	   We	   expect	   co-­‐‑nationality	  with	  candidates	  appearing	  on	  each	  list	  to	  affect	  party	  votes.	  In	  particular,	  we	  expect	  that	   the	  probability	  of	   voting	   for	   a	   given	  party	   list	  will	   be	   a	   function	  of	   the	  presence	  of	   co-­‐‑nationals	  on	  the	  list.	  	  	  
H2:.	  The	  probability	  of	  a	  subject	  voting	  for	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  party	  list,	  under	  both	  closed-­‐‑	  and	  open-­‐‑list	  PR,	  is	  higher	  when	  candidates	  from	  her	  country	  are	  on	  the	  list.	  	  
The	  findings	  	  	  We	   focus	   in	   this	  paper	  on	  the	  experimental	  subjects	   from	  France,	  Germany,	  and	  Sweden.	   In	  total,	   1116	   subjects	   from	   these	   countries	   completed	   the	   online	   voting	   experiment	   (421	   in	  France,	  316	  in	  Germany,	  and	  379	  in	  Sweden).	  Table	  1	  reports	  their	  list	  vote	  in	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot,	  under	  both	  open-­‐‑	  and	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR	   (the	   columns	   labelled	   ‘Non-­‐‑weighted’).	  The	   first	  observation	  to	  make	  is	  that	  the	  distribution	  is	  rather	  dispersed.	  No	  list	  reaches	  more	  than	  28%	  of	   the	   votes	   (i.e.	   the	  Greens-­‐‑EFA).	   This	   is	   in	   line	  with	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   EP,	  which	   is	   highly	  fragmented	  in	  terms	  of	  parties.	  	  [TABLE	  1	  ABOUT	  HERE]	  	  The	   second	   observation	   is	   that	   there	   are	   few	  differences	   between	   closed-­‐‑	   and	   open-­‐‑list	   PR	  systems.	  In	  the	  aggregate,	  the	  largest	  difference	  in	  votes	  concerns	  the	  Greens-­‐‑EFA,	  but	  it	  is	  only	  eight	  votes	  (so,	  not	  even	  1%	  of	  the	  1116	  votes	  cast).	  	  As	  noted	  in	  Laslier	  et	  al.	  (2015),	  left-­‐‑leaning	  voters	  are	  over-­‐‑represented	  in	  our	  sample.	  Only	  a	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bit	  more	  than	  30%	  of	  the	  1116	  subjects	  voted	  for	  a	  right	  wing	  or	  centre-­‐‑right	  pan-­‐‑European	  list	  (i.e.	  the	  ALDE,	  EPP,	  EFD,	  or	  ECR).	  In	  the	  actual	  2014	  EP	  election,	  these	  parties	  obtained	  just	  over	  50%	  of	  the	  seats.	  	  	  To	  correct	  this	  bias,	  we	  weight	  subjects	  using	  the	  actual	  results	  of	  the	  2014	  EP	  election.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  employ	  the	  experimental	  vote	  cast	  in	  the	  national	  ballot	  (regardless	  of	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  vote)	  under	  the	  given	  national	  electoral	  system	  in	  their	  country	  (open-­‐‑list	  PR	  in	  Sweden	  and	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR	  in	  France	  and	  Germany).	  Then,	  we	  apply	  this	  weight	  to	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  results.	  In	  the	  weighted	  sample,	  we	  also	  ensure	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  size	  of	  the	  country	  sub-­‐‑samples	  does	  not	  alter	  the	  results	  by	  making	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  weights	  equal	  to	  a	  standard	  1000	  units	  in	  each	  country.5	  Also,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  recruitment	  process,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  highly	   educated	   people	   interested	   in	   politics	   and	   citizens	   favourable	   to	   the	   EU	   are	   over-­‐‑represented	  in	  our	  sample.	  However,	  we	  lack	  pertinent	  information	  to	  correct	  for	  these	  biases.	  We	  discuss	  the	  potential	  problem	  these	  biases	  could	  create	  in	  the	  conclusion.	  	  Table	  1	  also	  shows	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot	  when	  we	  use	  the	  weighted	  sample.	  The	  online	   appendix	   reports	   the	   weighted	   and	   non-­‐‑weighted	   vote	   in	   each	   country	   in	   the	   pan-­‐‑European	  ballot,	  under	  both	  electoral	  systems	  (see	  Table	  A1).	  All	  the	  analyses	  presented	  in	  this	  article	   are	   based	   on	   the	   weighted	   sample.	   However,	   we	   always	   report	   the	   initial,	   before	  weighting,	  number	  of	  observations.	  	  	  To	  test	  our	  first	  hypothesis,	  we	  run	  a	  multinomial	  logit	  model	  predicting	  the	  probability	  of	  each	  subject	  giving	  a	  positive,	  negative,	  or	  neutral	  vote	  to	  each	  individual	  candidate	  on	  the	  list	  she	  voted	  for	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR.	  Each	  subject	  had	  to	  give	  ‘+1’	  (the	  default	  option),	   ‘0’,	  or	   ‘+2’	  to	  each	  of	  the	  10	  individual	  candidates	  on	  the	  list,	  so	  there	  are	  10	  times	  1116	  observations.	  On	  average,	  7%	  of	  the	  votes	  were	  negative,	  21%	  positive,	  and	  72%	  neutral.	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  The	  main	  independent	  variable	  is	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  candidate	  (‘1’	  if	  she	  is	  a	  co-­‐‑national	  of	  the	  subject,	   ‘0’	  otherwise).	  We	  also	  include	  several	  controls.	  Some	  of	  them	  are	  located	  at	  the	  subject-­‐‑level,	  others	  at	  the	  candidate-­‐‑level.	  At	  the	  subject-­‐‑level,	  we	  include	  the	  country	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  subject	  (France,	  Germany,	  or	  Sweden),	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  list	  she	  voted	  for	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  (to	  control	  for	  party	  bias),	  and	  the	  number	  of	  points	  she	  gave	  to	  candidates	  in	  total.	  At	  the	  candidate-­‐‑level,	  we	  include	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  whether	  the	  candidate	  is	  female	  or	  male,	  and	  her	  age.	  	  	  Table	  2	  reports	  the	  estimations	  of	  the	  multinomial	  logit	  models.	  It	  reveals	  that	  a	  voter	  has	  a	  between	  seven	  and	  eight	  times	  greater	  chance	  of	  giving	  a	  positive	  vote	  to	  a	  candidate	  of	  her	  country,	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal.	  This	  effect	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  p	  <	  0.01	  level	  and	   is	   much	   stronger	   than	   the	   effects	   of	   other	   candidate-­‐‑level	   covariates.	   As	   a	   matter	   of	  comparison	  the	  age	  of	  the	  candidate	  does	  not	  affect	  preferential	  voting,	  and	  although	  female	  candidates	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  receive	  positive	  votes	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  receive	  negative	  votes,	  the	  effect	  is	  much	  weaker.	  	  [TABLE	  2	  ABOUT	  HERE]	  	  Similarly,	   the	   chances	   of	   giving	   a	   negative	   vote	   to	   a	   co-­‐‑national	   candidate	   is	   32%	   lower.	  However,	  this	  effect	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  might	  be	  due	  to	  the	  rather	  low	  number	  of	   negative	   votes	   given	   in	   total	   (only	   7%).	   The	   empirical	   evidence	   thus	   supports	   our	   first	  hypothesis	  at	  least	  partially:	  subjects	  give	  more	  positive	  votes	  to	  candidates	  of	  their	  country.	  	  To	  test	  our	  second	  hypothesis,	  we	  run	  conditional	   logit	  models	  predicting	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	   for	   each	   list	   under	   both	   closed-­‐‑	   and	   open-­‐‑list	   PR	   systems.	   Each	   subject	   had	   the	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opportunity	  to	  vote	  for	  seven	  lists,	  so	  there	  are	  seven	  times	  1116	  observations.	  We	  measure	  the	  co-­‐‑nationality	  of	  the	  candidates	  on	  the	  list	  in	  three	  different	  ways.	  First,	  we	  use	  a	  continuous	  measure	  counting	  the	  number	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals	  in	  each	  list.	  In	  our	  dataset,	  this	  number	  goes	  from	  zero	  to	  six	  with	  more	  than	  90%	  of	  the	  lists	  having	  zero,	  one	  or	  two	  national	  candidates.	  Second,	  we	  use	  a	  categorical	  measure	  of	  the	  number	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  effect	  is	  linear	  or	  not,	  suspecting	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  one	  extra	  co-­‐‑national	  on	  the	  list	  diminishes	  as	  the	  number	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals	  increases.	  Finally,	  following	  the	  same	  intuition,	  we	  use	  a	  binary	  variable	  measuring	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  on	  the	  list	  or	  none.	  In	  our	  dataset,	  54%	  of	  the	  lists	  that	  appeared	  on	  the	  subject’s	  screen	  did	  not	  include	  any	  co-­‐‑national.	  	  	  In	  this	  analysis,	  we	  again	  include	  controls	  at	  the	  subject-­‐‑	  and	  list-­‐‑level.	  At	  the	  subject-­‐‑level,	  we	  use	  fixed-­‐‑effects	  to	  account	  for	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  factors	  affecting	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  for	  a	  given	  party	  list.	  At	  the	  level	  of	  the	  list,	  we	  include	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  whether	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  list	  vote	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  vote	  cast	  by	  the	  subject	  on	  the	  national	  ballot	  (same	  party	  group),	  the	  number	  of	  female	  candidates	  on	  the	  list,	  and	  the	  average	  age	  of	  the	  candidates.	  	  	  Tables	   3	   and	   4	   report	   the	   results	   for	   closed-­‐‑list	   and	   open-­‐‑list	   PR,	   respectively.	   Under	   both	  systems,	  we	  observe	  from	  the	  first	  column	  that	  for	  each	  extra	  co-­‐‑national	  candidate	  on	  a	  list,	  the	   probability	   of	   voting	   for	   the	   list	   increases	   by	   12%,	   all	   else	   being	   equal.	   This	   effect	   is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  p	  <	  0.05	  level.	  However,	  we	  see	  from	  the	  second	  column	  that	  the	  highest	   effect	   is	  between	   lists	   that	   include	  zero	   co-­‐‑nationals	   and	   those	   that	   include	   two	  co-­‐‑nationals.	   The	   probability	   of	   voting	   for	   the	   list	   increases	   by	   45-­‐‑65%	   in	   this	   situation	  (statistically	   significant	   at	   p	   <	   0.05).	   This	   seems	   to	   constitute	   a	   ceiling	   for	   the	   effect	   of	   co-­‐‑nationals:	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  extra	  co-­‐‑national	  does	  not	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  for	  the	  list	  further	  once	  this	  threshold	  of	  two	  co-­‐‑nationals	  is	  reached.	  However,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  draw	  any	   definitive	   conclusion	   here,	   as	   there	   are	   very	   few	   lists	   that	   included	  more	   than	   two	   co-­‐‑
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nationals	  (less	  than	  10%).	  	  [TABLES	  3	  AND	  4	  ABOUT	  HERE]	  	  The	  last	  columns	  of	  Tables	  3	  and	  4	  show	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  at	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  for	  a	  list	  by	  48%	  under	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR	  and	  50%	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR.	  These	  effects	  are	  strong	  and	  statistically	  significant	  at	  p	  <	  0.01.	  Tables	  3	  and	  4	  show	  that	  in	  all	  specifications	  and	  even	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  consistent	  voting,	  which	  is	  a	  powerful	  predictor,	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  on	  list	  choice	  is	  strong.	  This	  finding	  lends	  support	  for	  hypothesis	  2.	  	  Tables	   3	   and	   4	   also	   reveal	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   co-­‐‑national	   candidates	   on	   the	  probability	   of	   voting	   for	   a	   list	   is	   equally	   strong	   under	   both	   closed-­‐‑	   and	   open-­‐‑list	   PR	   (for	  example,	  the	  coefficients	  associated	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  on	  the	  list	  are	  0.4	  and	  0.41	  respectively).6	  	  
Further	  tests	  	  To	  evaluate	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  findings	  and	  to	  further	  investigate	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  on	  vote	  choice,	  we	  conducted	  some	  additional	  analyses.	  We	  use	  the	  same	  variables	  as	  in	  Tables	  2,	  3,	  and	  4.	  In	  the	  models	  predicting	  list	  voting,	  we	  use	  the	  binary	  measure	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  (presence	  or	  absence	  of	  a	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  on	  the	  list).	  	  First,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  concerns	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  EU	  is	  that	  citizens	  of	  some	  countries	  are	  more	  favourable	  to	  European	  integration	  than	  others	  (Hooghe	  and	  Marx,	  2009).	  We	  thus	  conduct	  the	  same	  analyses	  as	  above	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  separately.	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  The	   online	   appendix	   shows	   the	   odd	   ratios	   associated	   with	   the	   effects	   of	   co-­‐‑nationality	   on	  preferential	  and	  list	  voting,	  for	  French,	  German	  and	  Swedish	  subjects	  (see	  Figures	  A3	  and	  A4).	  It	  appears	  that	  co-­‐‑national	  candidates	  are	  as	  likely	  to	  receive	  a	  positive	  vote	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  countries.	  The	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  giving	  a	  negative	  vote	  is	  also	  confirmed.	  	  	  Similarly,	   we	   observe	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   at	   least	   one	   co-­‐‑national	   on	   the	  probability	  of	  voting	  for	  a	  list	  under	  both	  closed-­‐‑list	  and	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  is	  positive	  among	  French	  and	   German	   subjects.	   Swedish	   subjects	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   affected	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   co-­‐‑nationals	  on	  a	  party	  list.	  This	  result	  might	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Swedish	  citizens,	  just	  as	  those	  of	   other	  Nordic	   countries,	   show	  exceptionally	   high	   levels	   of	   social	   trust	   towards	   foreigners	  (Delhey	  and	  Newton,	  2005).	  This	  suggests	  that	  in	  this	  country	  partisan	  preferences	  trump	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality.	  However,	  future	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  validate	  this	  claim.	  	  Second,	  when	  modelling	  vote	  choice,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  odds	  of	  selecting	  a	  given	  party	  or	  list	  depend	  on	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  other	  alternatives.	  We	  re-­‐‑estimated	  the	  models	   in	  Tables	  3	   and	  4,	   excluding	   each	  of	   the	   seven	   lists	   one	   at	   the	   time.	  The	  online	  appendix	  exhibits	  the	  odds	  ratios	  associated	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  for	  a	   list	  under	  closed-­‐‑list	  and	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  (see	  Figure	  A5).	  For	  the	  most	  part,	   the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  is	  not	  affected.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  we	  exclude	  the	  EFD,	  the	  ECR,	  and	  the	  GUE-­‐‑NGL	  that	  the	  effect	  diminishes,	  but	  only	  slightly.	  This	  is	  rather	  logical	  given	  that	  very	  few	  co-­‐‑nationals	  appeared	  on	  these	  lists	  in	  our	  experiment	  and	  that	  these	  lists	  did	  not	  obtain	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  votes.	  	  	  Third,	  under	  closed-­‐‑list	  and	  some	  variants	  of	  open-­‐‑list	  PR,	  the	  order	  of	  candidates	  on	  the	  list	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matters	  for	  determining	  who	  is	  ultimately	  elected.	  The	  better	  placed	  a	  candidate	  is	  on	  a	  list,	  the	  higher	  her	  chances	  of	  being	  elected.	  Subjects	  may	  thus	  be	  more	  affected	  by	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  candidates	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  list.	  To	  test	  this	  intuition,	  we	  estimated	  the	  same	  models	  as	  in	  Tables	   3	   and	   4,	   first	   considering	   the	   number	   of	   nationals	   among	   the	   first	   nine	   candidates	  appearing	  on	  the	   list,	   then	  another	  model	   in	  which	  we	  considered	  the	   first	  eight	  candidates	  appearing	  on	  the	  list,	  and	  so	  on,	  until	  we	  considered	  just	  the	  first	  candidate	  appearing	  on	  the	  list.	  The	  online	  appendix	  reports	  the	  odds	  ratios	  associated	  with	  each	  of	  these	  variables	  (see	  Figure	  A5).	  We	  observe	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  for	  a	  party	  list	   does	   not	   vary	   according	   to	   the	   position	   of	   the	   candidates.	   This	   result	   suggests	   that	   the	  subjects	  were	  affected	  by	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  candidates	  regardless	  of	  their	  position	  on	  the	  party	   list.7 	  However,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   subjects	   were	   aware	   that	   the	   ordering	   of	   the	  candidates	  on	  the	  lists	  was	  random.	  In	  reality,	  parties	  decide	  upon	  this	  ordering	  and	  voters	  can	  use	  this	  information	  when	  making	  their	  choice	  (for	  example,	  candidates	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  list	  might	  be	  more	  competent	  than	  those	  at	  the	  bottom).	  	  Looking	   at	   these	   findings,	   a	   final	   question	   comes	   to	  mind:	   are	   voters	   ready	   to	   vote	   for	   an	  ideologically	  distant	  party	  in	  order	  to	  support	  candidates	  from	  their	  country?	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  we	  calculated	  the	  predicted	  vote	  of	  each	  subject	  based	  on	  the	  models	  in	  Tables	  3	  and	  4	  while	  (1)	  keeping	  all	  variables	  at	  their	  original	  values,	  (2)	  simulating	  that	  there	  was	  at	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  on	  each	  of	  the	  lists.	  The	  predicted	  vote	  in	  the	  second	  scenario	  can	  be	  considered	  the	  list	  for	  which	  the	  subject	  should	  have	  voted	  if	  there	  was	  no	  consideration	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality.	  In	  Table	  5,	  we	  cross	  these	  two	  predictions	  and	  report	  the	  proportion	  of	  subjects	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  changed	  their	  vote	  because	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  we	  have	  listed	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  party	  lists	  from	  the	  ideological	  right	  to	  left.	  	  [TABLE	  5	  ABOUT	  HERE]	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  From	   Table	   5,	   we	   see	   that	   most	   subjects	   did	   not	   switch	   their	   vote.	   When	   they	   do	   switch,	  however,	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  follow	  any	  clear	  ideological	  pattern.	  More	  precisely,	  for	  five	  of	  the	  seven	  lists	  (EED,	  EPP,	  S&D,	  Greens,	  and	  GUE-­‐‑NGL)	  the	  list	  that	  gets	  the	  most	  switchers	  is	  not	  the	  most	  proximate.	  For	  example,	  we	  observe	  that	  10%	  of	  EPP	  supporters	  voted	  for	  another	  list.	   Among	   them,	   81%	   switched	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  Greens.	   Thus,	   subjects	  who	   are	  willing	   to	  change	   their	   vote	   because	   of	   nationality	   considerations	   seem	   to	   be	   ready	   to	   support	  ideologically	  distant	  lists.	  Note	  that	  EFD	  and	  the	  ECR	  are	  absent	  of	  Table	  5.	  As	  very	  few	  subjects	  are	  predicted	  to	  vote	  for	  them	  (less	  than	  1%),	  we	  cannot	  interpret	  the	  results	  for	  these	  two	  lists.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  The	  EU	  is	  at	  a	  critical	  moment	  in	  its	  development.	  Many	  citizens	  express	  a	  negative	  attitude	  towards	  European	  integration	  and	  do	  not	  trust	  European	  decision-­‐‑makers.	  A	  proposal	  that	  has	  been	   put	   forward	   to	  mitigate	   this	   problem,	   and	   to	   help	   European	   representatives	   gain	   the	  confidence	  of	  the	  population,	  is	  to	  create	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	  in	  which	  a	  small	  number	  of	  MEPs	   would	   be	   elected.	   In	   this	   paper,	   we	   evaluated	   this	   proposal	   via	   a	   unique	   online	  experiment	  where	  we	  invited	  thousands	  of	  Europeans	  to	  report	  how	  they	  would	  vote	  in	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot,	  and	  where	  we	  randomised	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  candidates	  appearing	  on	  the	  lists.	  We	  find	  that	  vote	  choice	  in	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	  would	  be	  substantially	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	   of	   national	   candidates	   on	   the	   lists.	   Europeans	  would	   give	  more	   positive	   votes	   to	  candidates	  of	  their	  country	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR.	  They	  would	  also	  tend	  to	  vote	  for	  pan-­‐‑European	  party	  lists	  that	  included	  co-­‐‑nationals.	  	  We	  conclude	  by	  discussing	  three	  aspects	  of	  our	  online	  experiment	  that	  could	  potentially	  affect	  our	  results.	  First,	  on	  the	  website	  we	  presented	  a	  hypothetical	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot,	  but	  there	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was	   no	   pan-­‐‑European	   election	   at	   the	   time	   of	   our	   experiment.	   If	   there	   had	   been	   one,	   it	   is	  reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   pan-­‐‑European	   parties	   would	   have	   engaged	   in	   pan-­‐‑European	  campaigns.	   These	   campaigns	   would	   have	   increased	   the	   parties’	   visibility	   in	   the	   European	  public.	   If	   the	  citizen-­‐‑subjects	  had	  been	  more	   informed	  about	   the	  pan-­‐‑European	  parties,	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  they	  might	  have	  been	  less	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  national	  candidates	  on	  the	  lists.	  Also,	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  election	  might	  increase	  the	  politicisation	  of	  the	  EU	  and	   reduce	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   nationality	   of	   the	   candidates	   on	   vote	   choice.	   Still,	   the	   effect	   of	  national	  identity	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  substantial	  at	  least	  during	  the	  first	  pan-­‐‑European	  elections.	  	  Second,	  in	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot,	  we	  primed	  the	  subjects	  to	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  nationality	  by	  providing	   them	  with	   the	   country	  of	   origin	   of	   all	   the	   candidates	   appearing	  on	   the	   lists.	   This	  priming	  might	  have	  led	  to	  an	  overestimation	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  national	  candidates	  on	  the	  party	  lists	  on	  vote	  choice.	  	  	  Finally,	   the	   sample	  we	   rely	   on	   for	   our	   analyses	   is	   not	   fully	   representative	   of	   the	   European	  population.	  In	  particular,	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  recruitment	  process,	  highly	  educated	  citizens	  and	  citizens	  interested	  in	  politics	  who	  know	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  EP	  political	  groups	  are	  certainly	  over-­‐‑represented	  (the	  website	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  website	  on	  EP	  elections).	  We	  do	  not	  have	  the	  information	  necessary	  to	  correct	  for	  this	  bias,	  or	  to	  test	  for	  moderating	  effect,	  and	  it	  could	  have	  led	  to	  an	  underestimation	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  national	  candidates	  on	  party	  lists	  on	  vote	  choice.	  It	   is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  citizens	  who	  are	  less	  educated	  and	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  EU	  would	  be	  even	  more	  affected	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals	  on	  party	  lists.	  	  	  However,	   we	   can	   derive	   two	   concrete	   recommendations	   for	   EU	   decision-­‐‑makers	   from	   our	  findings.	  First,	  if	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	  is	  created,	  we	  recommend	  establishing	  a	  maximum	  number	  of	  candidates	  from	  each	  EU	  country	  on	  the	  lists.	  Given	  that	  there	  are	  currently	  28	  EU	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member	  states	  and	  that	   the	  original	  proposal	   is	   that	  20	  seats	  be	  created,	   this	  might	  mean	  a	  maximum	  of	  one	  candidate	  per	  country	  on	  each	  of	  the	  lists.8	  If	  this	  number	  is	  not	  fixed,	  pan-­‐‑European	  parties,	  anticipating	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  nationality	  of	  candidates	  appearing	  on	  the	  list	  on	  vote	  choice,	  as	  elucidated	  in	  this	  article,	  would	  be	  likely	  to	  nominate	  candidates	  from	  large	  countries.9	  	  	  Another	   strategy	   for	   pan-­‐‑European	   parties	  would	   be	   to	   nominate	   candidates	  with	  multiple	  nationalities,	  such	  as	  the	  former	  President	  of	  the	  Green-­‐‑EFA	  political	  group,	  who	  is	  German	  and	  French.	  Some	  studies	  show	  that	  the	  overall	  population	  of	  this	  type	  of	  ‘transnationally	  active’	  citizen	   within	   Europe	   is	   growing	   (Kuhn,	   2015).	   However,	   this	   would	   also	   weaken	   the	  transnational	  character	  of	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  election,	  as	  most	  candidates	  would	  come	  from	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Germany	  and	  France.	  In	  turn,	  it	  would	  not	  help	  European	  citizens	  from	  small	  countries	  to	  feel	  represented	  in	  the	  EU	  decision-­‐‑making	  process.	  	  Second,	   if	   a	   pan-­‐‑European	   district	   is	   created,	   the	   argument	   developed	   in	   this	   article	   lends	  support	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR	  system,	  instead	  of	  an	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  system.10	  Since	  we	  find	  that	  Europeans	  would	  give	  more	  positive	  votes	  to	  national	  candidates,	  the	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  system	  would	  also	  lead	  to	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  seats	  by	  large	  countries.	  Under	  this	  electoral	  system,	  which	  candidates	  are	  ultimately	  elected	  (partially)	  depends	  on	  the	  number	  of	  individual	  candidate	  votes.	  Again,	  this	  would	  not	  help	  citizens	  from	  small	  countries	  feel	  represented	  in	  the	  EU	  legislative	  process.	  All	  in	  all,	  although	  we	  see	  the	  great	  potential	  of	  creating	  a	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	   to	   reduce	   the	  EU	  democratic	  deficit,	  we	   recommend	  being	  cautious	   in	   setting	   the	   precise	   rules	   for	   this	   election.	   This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   EU	  legislators	  to	  think	  about	  now,	  as	  the	  rules	  might	  be	  difficult	  to	  modify	  after	  their	  enforcement.	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1.	  A	  few	  years	  ago,	  MEP	  A.	  Duff	  formerly	  introduced	  this	  proposal	  to	  the	  EP.	  See	  the	  report	  of	  the	  EP	  Committee	  on	  Constitutional	  Affairs	  (AFCO,	  2012).	  At	   time	  of	  writing	  this	  paper,	  a	  similar	  proposal	   is	  still	  on	  the	  table	   in	  the	  European	  legislature.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  type	  of	  electoral	  system	  in	  which	  voters	  have	  two	  votes	  in	  two	  PR	  districts	  is	  not	  used	  in	  any	  national	  election	  in	  Europe.	  In	  German	  and	  Hungarian	  national	  elections,	  for	  example,	  voters	  have	  two	  votes	  but	  one	  of	  them	  is	  cast	  in	  a	  single-­‐‑member	  district.	  2.	   In	   the	   original	   proposal	   of	   the	  pan-­‐‑European	  district	   discussed	   in	   footnote	  1,	   the	  number	   of	   pan-­‐‑European	  candidates	   was	   set	   to	   20.	   However,	   we	   decided	   to	   reduce	   this	   number	   to	   10	   for	   practical	   reasons.	   With	   20	  candidates,	  the	  ballots	  would	  have	  been	  too	  long	  and	  would	  not	  have	  fit	  on	  most	  computer	  screens.	  3.	  Only	  Luxembourg,	  Malta	  and	  Ireland	  used	  different	  electoral	  systems.	  In	  Luxembourg,	  the	  electoral	  system	  was	  panachage	  and	  cumulation.	  In	  Malta	  and	  Ireland,	  it	  was	  the	  single	  transferable	  vote.	  For	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  ballot	  structures	  and	  the	  voting	  rules	  in	  each	  of	  the	  28	  member	  states,	  see	  Oelbermann	  and	  Pukelsheim	  (2015).	  Note	  that	  Oelbermann	  and	  Pukelsheim’s	  terminology	  is	  slightly	  different	  from	  ours.	  For	  example,	  they	  use	  the	  term	  ‘flexible	  rules’	  to	  describe	  systems	  in	  which	  voters	  can	  influence	  the	  ranking	  of	  the	  party,	  but	  the	  original	  ranking	  of	  candidates	  by	  the	  party	  plays	  a	  role	   in	  the	  allocation,	  and	  the	  term	  ‘open	  rules’	  rules	  to	  describe	  systems	  in	  which	  voters	  have	  full	  control	  over	  which	  candidates	  are	  elected	  as	  there	  is	  no	  a	  priori	  ranking	  operated	  by	  the	  party	  (only	  a	  listing	  of	  candidates)	  such	  as	  in	  Cyprus,	  Greece	  and	  Finland.	  4.	   In	   our	   experiment,	   under	   the	  Latvian	   system,	   the	   voter	   gives	   a	   ‘+2’,	   a	   ‘+1’	   or	   a	   ‘0’	   to	   each	  of	   the	   individual	  candidates	   In	   reality,	   under	   the	   system	   used	   in	   Latvia,	   the	   voter	   gives	   a	   ‘+1’	   a	   ‘-­‐‑1’	   to	   each	   of	   the	   individual	  candidates	  on	  the	  list	  they	  vote	  for.	  By	  default,	  they	  give	  a	  ‘0’	  to	  all	  candidates	  on	  the	  list.	  This	  ballot	  is	  thus	  similar	  to	  ours	  as	  voters	  can	  give	  or	  take	  one	  point	  to	  the	  candidates.	  We	  chose	  the	  Latvian	  variant	  of	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  as	  it	  is	  allows	  voters	  to	  cast	  a	  vote	  that	  contains	  detailed	  information,	  i.e.	  positive	  and	  negative	  preferences	  for	  individual	  candidates	   (compared	   to	   the	   Belgian	   variant	   for	   example	   in	   which	   voters	   are	   only	   allow	   to	   report	   positive	  preferences).	  5.	  For	  each	  subject,	  we	  calculated	  a	  weight	  using	  the	  vote	  on	  the	  national	  ballot	  (as	  mentioned	  above,	  we	  asked	  subject	  to	  indicate	  their	  vote	  preference	  for	  the	  upcoming	  EP	  election	  using	  their	  actual	  national	  ballots,	  before	  asking	  them	  to	  indicate	  a	  vote	  preference	  in	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ball	  we	  district).	  The	  formula	  used	  to	  create	  this	  weight	  is:	  (vote	  share	  obtained	  by	  party	  x	  in	  reality	  *	  size	  of	  the	  sample	  in	  country	  y)	  /	  (1000	  *	  votes	  obtained	  by	  party	  x	  in	  sample),	  where	  party	  x	  is	  the	  national	  party	  for	  which	  the	  subject	  voted	  in	  the	  national	  ballot,	  and	  country	  y	  is	  her	  country.	  	  6.	  We	  could	  have	  expected	  a	  moderating	  effect	  of	  the	  electoral	  system	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  co-­‐‑nationality	  and	  list	  vote.	  In	  a	  recent	  study,	  Blumenau	  et	  al.	  (forthcoming)	  show	  that	  mainstream	  parties	  are	  more	  successful	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  than	  under	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR	  because	  voters	  who	  have	  an	  extreme	  preference	  over	  a	  certain	  ‘niche’	  issue	  do	  not	  have	  to	  vote	  for	  a	  niche	  party	  to	  express	  it.	  Under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR,	  they	  can	  express	  this	  position	  by	  giving	  a	  positive	  preference	  vote	  for	  a	  similarly-­‐‑extreme	  individual	  candidate	  on	  a	  mainstream	  party	  list.	  If	  one	  were	  to	  apply	   the	   same	   line	   of	   reasoning	   to	   preferences	   for	   co-­‐‑nationals,	   one	   would	   expect	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  presence/absence	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals	  on	  list	  votes	  to	  be	  larger	  under	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  our	  experiment.	  This	  null	  effect	  may	  come	  from	  our	  experimental	  design,	  as	  we	  asked	  experimental	  subjects	  to	  vote	   first	   under	   closed-­‐‑list	   PR	   and	   then	  under	   open-­‐‑list	   PR.	   It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   think	   that	  many	  of	   them	  were	  reluctant	   to	   switch	   their	   list	   vote	   from	  one	   system	   to	   the	  other	   in	   an	  attempt	   to	   appear	   consistent.	  This	   is	   an	  important	  difference	  from	  Blumenau	  et	  al.	  (forthcoming),	  who	  observe	  how	  similar	  voters	  behave	  when	  they	  face	  the	  same	  basic	  choice	  under	  different	  electoral	  systems.	  	  7.	  If	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  on	  vote	  choice	  is	  moderated	  by	  the	  position	  of	  the	  co-­‐‑national	  on	  the	  list,	  a	  fair	  fix	  could	  be	  to	  randomly	  select	  the	  order	  of	  the	  candidates	  or	  to	  use	  the	  alphabetical	  order	  (as	  it	  is	  currently	  operated	  for	  the	  European	  election	  in	  Cyprus,	  Greece,	  and	  Finland).	  8.	  The	  number	  of	  candidates	  on	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot	  should	  decrease	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  on	  list	  votes	  (Carey	  and	  Shugart,1995).	  However,	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  co-­‐‑nationality	  is	  	  likely	  to	  be	  substantive	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  with	  20	  candidates,	  or	  even	  28	  candidates	  (one	  candidate	  per	  country).	  	  9.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  such	  a	  proposal	  would	  not	  go	  against	  the	  requirement	  of	  proportional	  representation	  of	  member	  States	   in	   the	  EU	  decision-­‐‑making	  process,	  given	  that	   the	  allocation	  of	  power	   in	  EU	   institutions	   is	  also	  governed	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  degressive	  proportionality	  (for	  details,	  see	  Grimmet	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  10.	  Note	  that	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  systems	  have	  several	  advantages	  not	  discussed	  here	  such	  as	  the	  greater	  democratic	  leverage	   they	   give	   to	   voters	   as	   they	   can	   choose	  which	   candidates	   of	   the	   elected	   lists	   will	   serve	   as	   their	   heir	  representatives.	   Also,	   as	   pointed	   by	   one	   of	   the	   referees,	   there	   is	   an	   implication	   of	   this	   finding	   for	   candidates’	  nomination	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  in	  national	  elections.	  Parties	  should	  be	  able	  to	  anticipate	  the	  locality	  effect,	  at	  least	  in	  districts	  in	  which	  there	  are	  several	  localities,	  nominate	  candidates	  from	  more	  populated	  localities.	  This	  of	  course	  assumes	  that	  a	  locality	  effect	  also	  exists	  in	  national	  elections	  organized	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR	  and	  that	  this	  locality	  effect	  is	  not	  weaker	  in	  larger	  localities	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Table	  1.	  List	  voting	  in	  the	  pan-­‐‑European	  ballot.	  
(N=1116) Closed-­‐‑list N Open-­‐‑list N 
 Non-­‐‑weighted Weighted (initial) Non-­‐‑weighted Weighted (initial) EFD 5% 5% 56 5% 5% 59 ECR 4% 5% 41 3% 5% 35 EPP 7% 21% 77 7% 22% 77 ALDE 13% 17% 150 14% 17% 151 S&D 22% 23% 242 22% 22% 241 Greens-­‐‑EFA 27% 14% 306 28% 15% 314 GUE-­‐‑NGL 22% 15% 244 21% 14% 239 	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Table	  2.	  Predicting	  preference	  voting.	  
 Negative	  vote Positive	  vote 
 Coef. RRR Coef. RRR 
Co-­‐‑national	  candidate -­‐‑0.39	  (0.28) 0.68	  (0.19) 2.03**	  (0.14) 7.62**	  (1.10) 
Age	  of	  the	  candidate 0.01	  (<0.01) 1.01	  (0.01) -­‐‑0.01*	  (<0.01) 0.99*	  (<0.01) 
Female	  candidate 0.12	  (0.15) 1.12	  (0.16) 0.28**	  (0.10) 1.32**	  (0.13) 
Subject’s	  total	  number	  of	  points	  given -­‐‑5.69**	  (0.36) <0.01**	  (<0.01) 4.73**	  (0.26) 112.90**	  (28.83) 
Subject’s	  party	  vote	  (GUE-­‐‑NGL	  as	  reference):     
EFD 0.42	  (0.28) 1.53	  (0.43) 0.42	  (0.23) 1.52	  (0.35) 
ECR -­‐‑0.02	  (0.34) 0.98	  (0.34) 0.11	  (0.20) 1.12	  (0.30) 
EPP 0.31	  (0.24) 1.37	  (0.33) 0.13	  (0.16) 1.14	  (0.18) 
ALDE 0.86**	  (0.23) 2.35**	  (0.55) 0.55**	  (0.17) 1.73**	  (0.29) 
S&D 0.63**	  (0.19) 1.88**	  (0.36) 0.35**	  (0.13) 1.43**	  (0.18) 
Greens-­‐‑EFA 0.57**	  (0.18) 1.76**	  (0.31) -­‐‑0.07	  (0.11) 0.93	  (0.10) 
Subject’s	  country	  (Sweden	  as	  reference):     
France 0.12	  (0.17) 1.13	  (0.19) -­‐‑0.29*	  (0.12) 0.75*	  (0.09) 
Germany 0.01	  (0.16) 1.01	  (0.16) -­‐‑0.34**	  (0.11) 0.71**	  (0.08) 







Note:	  Entries	  are	  coefficients	  (Coef.)	  and	  relative	  risk	  ratios	  (RRR)	  estimated	  through	  multino-­‐‑mial	   logit	  predicting	  preference	  voting	   for	   individual	  candidates	  (neutral	  vote	  as	  reference).	  Standard	  errors	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  p	  <	  0.05,	  **	  p	  <	  0.01	  (two-­‐‑tailed).	  
  
 28 
Table	  3.	  Predicting	  list	  voting	  (closed-­‐‑list	  PR).	  
 Continuous Categorical Binary 
 Coef. OR Coef. OR Coef. OR Number	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals	  (linear) 0.12*	  (0.05) 1.13*	  (0.06)     
Number	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals:	  (categorical,	  0	  as	  reference)       1	  co-­‐‑national   0.37*	  (0.17) 1.45*	  (0.25)   
2	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.50*	  (0.24) 1.65*	  (0.39)   
3	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.31	  (0.16) 1.37	  (0.22)   
4	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.27	  (0.31) 1.30	  (0.41)   
5	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.56	  (0.41) 1.75	  (0.71)   
6	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.65	  (1.03) 1.91	  (1.96)   
At	  least	  1	  co-­‐‑national     0.40**	  (0.15) 1.48**	  (0.23) 
Consistent	  vote 2.07**	  (0.11) 7.91**	  (0.90) 2.04**	  (0.11) 7.72**	  (0.88) 2.04**	  (0.11) 7.69**	  (0.87) 
Number	  of	  women 0.08*	  (0.04) 1.08*	  (0.04) 0.07	  (0.04) 1.08	  (0.04) 0.07	  (0.04) 1.08	  (0.04) 
Age	  (mean) 0.04	  (0.02) 1.04	  (0.02) 0.03	  (0.02) 1.03	  (0.02) 0.03	  (0.02) 1.03	  (0.02) 
Chi2 389.72** 380.67** 377.32** 
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N 1160 1160 1160 Observations 7812 7812 7812 	  	  
Note:	  Entries	  are	  coefficients	  (Coef.)	  and	  odd	  ratios	  (OR)	  estimated	  through	  multinomial	  con-­‐‑ditional	  logit	  with	  subject-­‐‑level	  fixed	  effects	  predicting	  list	  voting	  under	  closed-­‐‑list	  PR.	  Standard	  errors	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  p	  <	  0.05,	  **	  p	  <	  0.01	  (two-­‐‑tailed).	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Table	  4.	  Predicting	  list	  voting	  (open-­‐‑list	  PR).	  
 Continuous Categorical Binary 
 Coef. OR Coef. OR Coef. OR Number	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals	  (linear)       Number	  of	  co-­‐‑nationals:	  (categorical,	  0	  as	  reference) 0.12*	  (0.05) 1.12*	  (0.05)     
1	  co-­‐‑national   0.41*	  (0.17) 1.50*	  (0.26)   
2	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.45*	  (0.22) 1.57*	  (0.34)   
3	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.33	  (0.17) 1.38	  (0.24)   
4	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.28	  (0.31) 1.32	  (0.41)   
5	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.56	  (0.41) 1.76	  (0.72)   
6	  co-­‐‑nationals   0.05	  (0.11) 1.05	  (0.81)   
At	  least	  1	  co-­‐‑national     0.41**	  (0.15) 1.50**	  (0.23) 
Consistent	  vote 2.06**	  (0.11) 7.84**	  (0.88) 2.03**	  (0.11) 7.63**	  (0.85) 2.03**	  (0.11) 7.64**	  (0.85) 
Number	  of	  women 0.08*	  (0.04) 1.09*	  (0.04) 0.07	  (0.04) 1.08	  (0.04) 0.07	  (0.04) 1.08	  (0.04) 
Age	  (mean) 0.03	  (0.02) 1.03	  (0.02) 0.03	  (0.02) 1.03	  (0.02) 0.03	  (0.02) 1.03	  (0.02) 
Chi2 386.00** 379.75** 375.07** N 1160 1160 1160 
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Observations 7812 7812 7812 	  	  
Note:	  Entries	  are	  coefficients	  (Coef.)	  and	  odd	  ratios	  (OR)	  estimated	  through	  multinomial	  con-­‐‑ditional	  logit	  with	  subject-­‐‑level	  fixed	  effects	  predicting	  list	  voting	  under	  open-­‐‑list	  PR.	  Standard	  errors	  are	  in	  parentheses.	  *	  p	  <	  0.05,	  **	  p	  <	  0.01	  (two-­‐‑tailed).	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Table	  5.	  Proportion	  of	  switchers,	  compared	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  in	  each	  list. 
 













Closed-­‐‑list EPP 10% 0% 0% -­‐‑ 3% 3% 81% 12% ALDE 24% 0% 0% 40% -­‐‑ 41% 13% 6% 
S&D 7% 5% 0% 15% 23% -­‐‑ 25% 31% 
Greens-­‐‑EFA 3% 0% 0% 19% 66% 7% -­‐‑ 7% GUE-­‐‑NGL 9% 0% 0% 4% 59% 0% 37% -­‐‑ 
Open-­‐‑list EPP 9% 0% 0% -­‐‑ 1% 5% 84% 12% ALDE 18% 0% 0% 10% -­‐‑ 63% 22% 5% 
S&D 7% 6% 0% 13% 34% -­‐‑ 26% 23% 
Greens-­‐‑EFA 4% 0% 0% 17% 64% 6% -­‐‑ 13% GUE-­‐‑NGL 5% 0% 0% 8% 18% 0% 74% -­‐‑ 
 
	  
Note:	  Based	  on	  models	  of	  Table	  3	  and	  4,	  column	  ‘Binary’.	  Entries	  are	  the	  proportions	  of	  subjects	  that	  are	  predicted	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  list	  if	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  in	  each	  list	  but	  that	  are	  not	  predicted	  to	  vote	  for	  this	  list	  when	  we	  keep	  co-­‐‑nationality	  at	  its	  original	  values.	  For	  example,	  the	  first	  row	  can	  be	  read	  as	  ‘10%	  of	  the	  subjects	  that	  are	  predicted	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  EPP	  if	  there	  was	  at	  least	  one	  co-­‐‑national	  in	  each	  list	  did	  not	  vote	  for	  the	  EPP.	  Among	  them,	  3%	  voted	  for	  the	  ALDE,	  3%	  for	  the	  S&D,	  81%	  for	  the	  Greens-­‐‑EFA,	  and	  12%	  for	  the	  GUE-­‐‑NGL.’	  EFD	  and	  ECR	  are	  excluded	  from	  this	  table	  because	  only	  very	  few	  subjects	  reported	  a	  vote	  for	  these	  list.	  
